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Political Participation and Entrepreneurial Initial Public 





This paper examines the value of political participation by private entrepreneurs in 
China. Using a unique sample of all initial public offerings by entrepreneurial firms 
during 1994-2007 and political participation by the controlling entrepreneurs, we test 
the hypothesis that firms with entrepreneurs who participate in politics are able to 
exploit rent-seeking opportunities that normal firms do not have access to. We 
document that the long-run stock performance after the IPO of firms controlled by 
entrepreneurs who participate in politics is superior to that of common entrepreneurial 
firms. Our results also show that political participation has a significant positive effect 
on change in operating performance and a negative effect on first-day returns. 
Moreover, we find that economic development and local institutions are important for 
this value effect. The difference in performance is even larger in regions characterized 
by more abundant rent-seeking opportunities, indicating that the value effect of political 
participation likely originates from rent seeking. This finding is consistent with the 
hypothesis that political participation facilitates entrepreneurs’ rent seeking.  
 
JEL Classification: G30; G32; G34; P48 
Keywords: Political participation; Entrepreneurial firms; Corporate governance; Initial 




1  Introduction 
As the private sector has become the growth engine of China’s economy, 
companies established and controlled by entrepreneurs are receiving increasing 
attention (Allen et al., 2005; Djankov et al., 2006; Li et al., 2006; Huang, 2008). 
However, while relationships between politicians and firms are a common theme in 
studies on China’s state-controlled firms (e.g., Fan et al., 2007; Li et al., 2008; 
Calomiris et al., 2010), the effects of political participation on entrepreneurial firms 
have not been thoroughly researched. In this paper, we focus on how Chinese private 
entrepreneurs engage in politics and analyze whether their political participation results 
in benefits for their firms. We do this by focusing on the effects of political participation 
on long-term performance after initial public offerings (IPOs) and underpricing of IPOs 
for firms controlled by private entrepreneurs.  
The reasons for and effects of political participation are not self evident. One 
potential motivation behind political participation is that it may facilitate rent seeking. 
Politicians have direct and significant impacts on firms through government decisions. 
These decisions may influence the expected future cash flow for firms through various 
channels, including preferential access to government subsidies, beneficial taxation 
schemes, reduced regulatory constraints, preferential access to government contracts, 
etc. Politicians may therefore use their influence over firms to achieve their political as 
well as private objectives and to reward their supporters (e.g., La Porta et al., 2002; 
Rajan and Zingales, 2003). In a seminal paper, Krueger (1974) argues that it is natural  
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for firms to devote economic resources toward rent seeking in order to compete for 
favorable policy decisions. In a related study, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) develop a 
model of bargaining between politicians and managers in which bribes and subsidies to 
state-controlled firms emerge. As a consequence, politically connected firms will 
demonstrate superior performance. An alternative reason for entering into politics is to 
strengthen the social status rather than for economic benefit. That is, entrepreneurs may 
choose to participate in politics for the common good. Political participation due to this 
alternative reason does not result in superior performance. The effects of political 
participation thus need to be analyzed empirically. 
Apart from studies that focus on the U.S., the literature on political connections 
and their implications for firms around the world is still relatively modest
1. Fisman 
(2001) find that firms with ties to President Suharto experienced significant losses in 
value following announcements of Suharto’s deteriorating health. In a related study, 
Faccio and Parsley (2007) document how an unexpected death of a politician results in 
a negative effect on firms from his or her home town. Johnson and Mitton (2003) 
analyze how capital controls imposed by Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahathir in 1998 
benefitted firms with political ties. Similarly, Ferguson and Voth (2008) show how 
German firms that supported the Nazi movement in 1933 outperformed regular firms. 
                                                 
1 A number of studies have analyzed how political connections play an important role for U.S. firms (e.g., 
Buchanan, 1980; Roberts, 1990; Kroszner and Stratmann, 1998; Jayachandran, 2006; Knight, 2006; 
Benmelech and Moskowitz, 2007; Goldman et al., 2009).  
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Claessens et al. (2008) find that firms that provided campaign contributions in the 
Brazilian 1998 and 2002 elections experienced higher increases in stock returns 
compared to other firms. They also estimate the cost of this form of rent seeking to be at 
least 0.2% of GDP per year during the election cycles. Faccio (2006) documents that 
firms with political connections tend to be from countries with weaker legal systems 
and higher levels of corruption. Faccio et al. (2006) also provide evidence that firms 
with political connections are more likely to be bailed out by the government.  
Besides the general influence political connections may have on firms, some 
recent studies have focused on the channels through which political connections and 
rent-seeking work. One such channel is that of preferential access to finance. Khwaja 
and Mian (2005) document how politically connected firms in Pakistan borrow twice as 
much as other firms and exhibit much higher default rates. Similarly, Charumilind et al. 
(2006) show how Thai firms with connections to politicians and banks had better access 
to long-term debt before the Asian financial crisis. Dinc (2005) find that political 
motivations affect actions taken by government-owned banks in a set of emerging 
countries by focusing on banks’ behavior during elections. 
  In this paper we focus on Chinese entrepreneurial firms, which we define as 
firms controlled by either entrepreneurs or their families. We explore the issue of 
whether or not political participation has a significant effect on entrepreneurial firms in 
China. The general purpose of inviting entrepreneurs to participate in politics is for 
them to serve the common good. For example, political entrepreneurs can give voice to 
institutional problems that constrain the development of entrepreneurial business.  
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However, entrepreneurs may also utilize opportunities gained from political 
participation for their private benefit through rent-seeking within or beyond the political 
network in which they act. We empirically test the association between political 
participation and post-IPO performance. Our findings show that political participation is 
positively associated with post-IPO performance in terms of both long-term stock 
returns and changes in accounting performance. This is consistent with the argument 
that political participation facilitates rent seeking for entrepreneurs’ private benefit. 
We further analyze whether regional institutions affect the relationship between 
post-IPO performance and political participation. We find that the relationship between 
the two is even stronger in regions with weaker institutions, which cultivate more rent-
seeking opportunities. This finding further supports the argument that political 
participation facilitates rent-seeking by private entrepreneurs. 
  This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we address the side 
effects of an institution designed for social goods. That is, political participation by 
entrepreneurs generates private benefits for firms under their control. This finding is in 
sharp contrast to those of Fan et al. (2007), who find that politically connected firms 
underperform non-connected firms. The empirical analysis in this paper focuses on 
entrepreneurial firms while Fan et al. (2007) mainly focus on state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs). Thus, the incentive of the ultimate controlling shareholder is different. Our 
results also corroborate those of Allen et al. (2005), who document that China’s formal 
sector (i.e. state-controlled firms) underperforms the informal sector (i.e. entrepreneurial 
firms). Second, we show that institutions matter in disciplining rent seeking through  
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political participation. This implies that the development of institutions will encourage 
economic development as well as strengthen the political system. Third, we identify a 
key political resource utilized by private entrepreneurs for rent seeking. This study 
documents the value of networking through participation in important political events.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section offers a brief 
introduction to the setting for private firms in China. Section 3 then introduces the data 
sample and discusses its descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents the empirical results 
on post-IPO stock price and accounting performance of entrepreneurial firms. Section 5 
analyzes the effects of entrepreneurs’ political participation on underpricing during 
IPOs. Section 6 considers the potential effects of differences in rent-seeking 
opportunities and their relation to political participation. Finally, Section 7 concludes 
the study. 
2  Institutional Background  
The private sector was not an important driver for economic growth during the 
initial phase of China’s economic reforms (e.g., Dougherty et al., 2007). Instead, a dual-
track system allowed for the gradual introduction of market prices with incentives for 
employees in the state-owned sector, resulting in increased efficiency and productivity 
(Naughton, 2007). During this period, enterprises owned by local collectives constituted 
one of the major successes in the transition from planned to market economy in China 
during the 1980s and early 1990s (Naughton, 1994). These firms managed to survive 
and exhibit an unprecedented level of growth partly due to ambiguous property right  
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arrangements at the time, which allowed such firms to seek at least some protection 
from state expropriation (e.g., Weitzman and Xu, 1994; Li, 1996; Che and Qian, 1998). 
In a business environment marked by unclear property rights, this arrangement 
diminished the “holdup” problem, i.e. entrepreneurs hesitating to make new 
investments. By sharing a portion of the profit with the state as exchange for protection, 
the entrepreneurial firms were able to generate high growth. This explains why most 
entrepreneurial firms registered under “red hats” or as township-village enterprises 
(Tsai 2007; Huang 2008). 
Opposite to previous findings that proper legal institutions lead to higher 
economy growth (e.g., Demirgüç and Maksimovic, 1998; Beck and Levine, 2002), 
Allen et al. (2005) find that even though China’s private sector has been subject to poor 
legal protection and inferior access to financing channels, it has expanded faster than 
other sectors in China. In 2005, there were close to 30 million registered private firms in 
the country, accounting for approximately 50% of China’s GDP (Tsai, 2007). Using 
data for a quarter of a million companies, Dougherty et al. (2007) document how the 
private sector increased in importance at the turn of the century. Private firms accounted 
for approximately 25% of total industrial production in 1998, and more than 50% five 
years later. The private sector has thus grown into a major component of the Chinese 
economy. In addition to private firms’ importance in the Chinese economy, the property 
rights of entrepreneurial firms are better defined today. As an example, a large number 
of firms organized under red hats are disaffiliating themselves from state agents. 
However, private entrepreneurs seek other channels to protect their property rights  
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given that legal protection is not yet sufficient. Political participation is one such 
potential channel. In general, the development of the private sector in China has taken 
place on an uneven playing field.  Private entrepreneurs have been discriminated against 
not only socially, but also politically as different political movements have cracked 
down on the private sector on a regular basis during the early stages of reform (Li et al., 
2008). One solution for private entrepreneurs when it comes to handling such 
discriminatory practice has been to foster close relationships with politicians. One way 
to do this is through participation in local and national politics.  
3  Data and Research Design 
3.1  Data  
Our sample consists of all the entrepreneurial firms that went public during 1994 
to 2007. There was a total of over 1400 IPOs during this period. Of these, we identified 
265 IPOs carried out by firms that we classify as controlled by private entrepreneurs or 
their families. Following La Porta et al. (1999), we require that an entrepreneur or his or 
her family control at least 10% of the firm’s shares for it to be defined as an 
entrepreneurial firm. We manually collected the political participation record, described 
in detail later, of the ultimate controlling shareholder of the company. We also 
constructed institutional data of the region where the company is registered. In addition 
to these data, we use accounting and stock price data from the China Security Market 
and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database.   
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3.2  Measuring Private Entrepreneurs’ Political Participation  
We use membership at the Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCCP), 
the National People’s Congress (NPC), the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC), or their provincial counterparts as a proxy for political 
participation.
2 The CCCP is the highest body within the Communist Party of China 
(CCP) and is held once every five years. The NPC functions as the country’s legislative 
body and is formally the highest organ of the state. However, Chen and Dickson (2010) 
argue that the different levels of the NPC are de facto controlled by the CCP since 
deputies above the county level are elected by deputies at lower levels, who are in turn 
elected by individual voters. Thus, taking part in the NPC indicates an acceptance by 
the party and a direct channel to political power for private entrepreneurs. The CPPCC 
is an advisory body that consists of members from different parties and organizations. 
In practice, the CPPCC is to a large extent controlled by the CCP as well. Previously, 
the CPPCC has mainly been used as a vehicle for the CCP to win over non-CCP 
constituencies and get them to support the party. However, there are clear signs that the 
CPPCC is becoming more systematically involved in CCP’s policymaking process 
(Shambaugh, 2009). Similar to the NPC, members of the CPPCC and its sub branches 
are approved by CCP organizations. Chen and Dickson (2010) argue that private 
entrepreneurs’ membership in the NPC and CPPCC can be seen as a result of the CCP’s 
                                                 
2 Research has shown that private entrepreneurs have shown considerable interest in joining these state 
entities (e.g., Wright, 2010).  
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strategy to include capitalists in the political system. On the other hand, entrepreneurs’ 
decision to join any of these political bodies is likely related to the fact it enables them 
to build and exploit their political networks. That is, membership in the CCCP, NPC, 
CPPCC, or any of their provincial branches is very likely to result in significant rent-
seeking opportunities for private entrepreneurs. To capture indirect political 
connections, we look at both the entrepreneur and his or her family members.  
3.3  Institutional Effect on the Value of Political Participation 
Empirical research has shown that variations in institutional quality help explain 
cross-country differences in income (Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2001). 
Related studies look at how the level of rent seeking is dependent on a country’s type of 
institutions. Research has also shown how effective property rights and the rule of law 
make it more difficult for rent seeking. A common result in this literature is that 
corruption and rent seeking has a negative effect on economic performance (e.g., 
Baumol, 1990; Murphy et al., 1991, 1993; Mauro, 1995; Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). In 
general, rent-seeking opportunities seem to be related to economic development, 
markets and institutions. We therefore expand our analysis by including three variables 
that capture these dimensions to see how they influence the effect political participation 
has on entrepreneurial firms. First, Treisman (2000) finds that economic development 
has a causal effect on corruption. Also, Faccio (2006) uses GDP per capita as a proxy 
for economic development when analyzing the effects of political connections. We 
therefore separate the firms into two categories based on economic development: the  
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first group is comprised of firms with their headquarters being located in provinces with 
low GDP per capita, while the other contains firms situated in relatively wealthier 
provinces. Second, we separate entrepreneurial firms into two groups based on the level 
of marketization in their respective location. Here, we use the National Economic 
Research Institute (NERI) Index of Marketization for China’s Provinces.
3 Third, we 
follow an approach similar to that of Acemoglu et al. (2001) and divide China’s 
provinces into two groups based on whether or not they were once leased to foreign 
powers for a significant period before 1949. The entrepreneurial firms are then 
separated into two groups depending on where their main operations are located. The 
main hypothesis is that lower real GDP per capita, lower levels of marketization, and 
territories that were never leased to industrial countries before 1949 are conducive for 
rent-seeking opportunities. Thus, political participation will have a more salient effect 
on firm performance in regions with more rent-seeking opportunities if the political 
participation really facilitates rent seeking.  
                                                 
3 The NERI index focuses on provinces’ progress towards a market economy relative to other provinces. 
Each province is measured following a zero to ten score system. The index is based on 23 indicators of 
institutional arrangements and policies in five areas: size of the regional government; economic structure 
(growth of the non-state sector and the reform of state-controlled firms); inter-regional trade barriers; 
development of factor markets; and legal frameworks (Wang et al., 2007).  
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3.4  Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for IPOs in China. Panel A shows the 
sample distribution by year. Overall, we have 265 IPO events by entrepreneurial firms. 
Column 5 in Panel A presents the percentage of IPOs by firms controlled by 
entrepreneurs who participate in politics out of total IPOs in each year. Out of the 265 
entrepreneurial firms that conducted an IPO during 1994-2007, 67 (or 25.28%) of them 
had a controlling entrepreneur or at least one of his or her family members that was a 
member of the CCCP, NPC, CPPCC, or one of their provincial branches. The ratio of 
entrepreneurial firms with political connections to the total number of entrepreneurial 
firms ranges from 0 to 44% depending on the year. There are IPOs carried out by firms 
controlled by entrepreneurs who participate in politics every year except for 1995 and 
1997. 
Panel B in Table 1 describes the industry distribution of the sample firms 
following the China Securities Regulatory Commission’s (CSRC) classification 
standards. Of the 265 entrepreneurial firms that did an IPO during the sample period, a 
total of 185 are mainly active in the manufacturing sector. Similarly, most of the firms 
that are controlled by entrepreneurs who participate in politics (52 out of 67) are active 
in the manufacturing sector. For a few industries, such firms make out a majority of the 
total entrepreneurial firms that went public during the sample period. For example, in 
the mining and real estate sectors, all entrepreneurial firms that went public were 
controlled by entrepreneurs who participate in politics. However, it should be noted that 
the number of entrepreneurial IPOs in these sectors is very small.  
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  Table 2 provides summary statistics for firm characteristics in the two firm 
samples. The two sample groups exhibit significant differences in almost all firm 
characteristics during the IPO year. Looking at Tobin’s Q, which we calculate as the 
sum of the market value of a firm’s equity and book value of total liabilities divided by 
total assets at the end of the IPO year, it is evident that firms controlled by 
entrepreneurs who participate in politics have a higher Tobin’s Q than other 
entrepreneurial firms. This suggests that investors value entrepreneurial political 
participation. If we instead look at Leverage, which equals total liabilities over total 
assets at the end of IPO year, it is clear that firms controlled by entrepreneurs who 
participate in politics have a higher leverage than other entrepreneurial firms. Looking 
at firm size, which is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets at the end of the 
IPO year, firms with entrepreneurial political participation are larger than firms which 
are not controlled by entrepreneurs who participate in politics. The only firm 
characteristic that is not statistically different for the two samples is that of Ownership, 
which is measured as the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder. Although 
the average largest shareholder of firms with entrepreneurial political participation own 
a larger share of his or her firm than the major shareholder of common entrepreneurial 




4  Political Participation and Firm Performance 
4.1  Effect of Political Participation on Stock Performance 
We first investigate the impact that political participation has on stock 
performance of entrepreneurial firms. Here stock performance is measured as the 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), where the abnormal return is defined as market-
adjusted monthly return. Market returns are calculated as equally-weighted monthly 
returns of all stocks on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. We analyze the 
impact over windows that range from one year to three years beginning one month after 
the IPO. Panel A in Table 3 reports the mean and median values for long-run stock 
performance after the IPO. The entrepreneurial firms are sorted in groups based on 
whether or not they are controlled by entrepreneurs who participate in politics. Both 
groups exhibit decreasing CARs over time. The mean CAR of firms controlled by 
entrepreneurs who participate in politics exhibits a modest decline of approximately 
4.7% over the first twelve months compared to a much steeper decline of close to 
13.0% for the group of firms without such entrepreneurs. Similarly, the decline in the 
mean CAR after 36 months is approximately 12.4% for firms controlled by 
entrepreneurs who participate in politics and a much larger 30.0% for firms not 
controlled by such entrepreneurs. T-tests show that the mean CAR is significantly lower 
at the 5% level for the one- and two-year CARs and at the 1% level for the three-year 
CAR. Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for differences in the median show that the median 
CAR is significantly lower at the 10% level after two and three years, respectively. The  
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pattern of CARs is plotted in Figure 1. These initial findings are opposite to those of 
Fan et al. (2007), who showed that firms with political connections exhibit larger 
decreases in stock returns than firms without such connections. While the standard 
grabbing hand argument explains the SOEs’ results in Fan et al. (2007), it does not 
provide a good explanation for our entrepreneurial results. From this initial comparison 
of the two groups of firms, it is evident that entrepreneurial firms without political 
participation experience much more drastic declines in stock performance after their 
IPO. 
We also estimate ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions using the one-, two-, 
and three-year CARs as dependent variables. For our purpose, we focus on a dummy 
variable that is equal to one if the controlling entrepreneur participate in politics and 
zero otherwise. We also control for other firm-specific variables, including Ownership, 
Tobin’s Q, Leverage, and Size. We also include industry and year dummies, but do not 
report them for the sake of brevity. Finally, we winsorize all continuous variables at the 
top and bottom 5% in order to minimize the effect of outliers. 
  Panel B in Table 3 presents the results of the multivariate regressions. We find 
that political participation is positively related to long-run stock performance at the 5% 
level for one- and two-year CARs and at the 1% level for three-year CARs. Firms 
controlled by entrepreneurs who participate in politics outperform other entrepreneurial 
firms with 8.2%, 16.4%, and 17.3% for one-, two-, and three-year CARs, respectively. 
For the other independent variables, it is only Tobin’s Q and Firm Size that are 
significant, with a positive effect on long-run stock performance for both variables over  
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all three time horizons. Overall, it is clear that political participation opens up new 
channels that can be used to create value for the firms controlled by entrepreneurs who 
participate in politics. 
4.2  Effect of Political Participation on Accounting Performance 
To further investigate the effects of political participation, we look at changes in 
post-IPO accounting performance measured as growth in sales, growth in earnings, and 
change in return on sales (ROS), respectively. Growth in sales (earnings) is calculated 
as the growth rate of sales (earnings) from the average annual sales (earnings) three 
years before to three years after the IPO. The change in ROS is calculated as the 
difference between the average annual ROS of the three years after and that of the three 
years before the IPO.  
Panel A in Table 4 presents the results of the between-group tests for differences 
in the mean and median for firms controlled by entrepreneurs with or without political 
participation. The firms controlled by entrepreneurs participating in politics exhibit a 
significantly higher growth in sales, albeit only at the 10% significance level. Growth in 
earnings exhibits much stronger differences. Firms controlled by entrepreneurs that 
participate in politics have a significantly higher mean of growth in earnings at the 1% 
level and a higher median at the 10% level. Finally, the mean and median of ROS are 
higher for firms controlled by entrepreneurs who participate in politics, even though the 
difference is not statistically significant. Overall, we can tentatively conclude that the 
between-group results for accounting performance are supportive of the results we  
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found for long-run stock performance. That is, firms controlled by entrepreneurs who 
participate in politics outperform other entrepreneurial firms. 
  To shed more light on the differences between the two groups, we perform 
multivariate regressions, the results of which are reported in Panel B in Table 4. 
Political participation has a significant positive effect on all three accounting 
performance measures. The coefficient for political participation is significant at the 5% 
level for growth in sales, at the 1% level for growth in earnings, and at the 10% level for 
change in ROS. These findings corroborate our results on long-run stock performance 
and suggest that political participation by entrepreneurs benefits the firms they control 
during IPO events. A natural next question is: do shareholders value political 
participation during the IPO pricing process? 
5  Underpricing of Entrepreneurial IPOs 
Having found that political participation contributes to firms’ long-term 
performance, we also expect that it will play an important role in the pricing of shares 
during the IPO process. Firms with political participation do not need a significant 
underpricing if political participation can act as a credible signal for future performance. 
While IPO underpricing is a common feature around the world, underpricing in IPOs in 
China is usually extremely high (e.g., Chan et al., 2004; Fan et al., 2007; Tian and 
Megginson, 2007). Previous research has discussed this phenomenon from the 
perspective of political connections in China. However, existing studies mainly focus 
on state-controlled firms. For example, Fan et al. (2007) and Francis et al. (2009) both  
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provide evidence that political connections reduce IPO underpricing for state-controlled 
firms.
4   We instead analyze the relationship between political participation and 
underpricing for Chinese entrepreneurial IPOs.  
Panel A in Table 5 presents the mean and median statistics of IPO underpricing 
for entrepreneurial firms. Underpricing is measured as the return on the first trading 
day, i.e. the difference between the first-day closing price and the offering price divided 
by the offering price. The table shows the mean and median for our groups of firms 
controlled by entrepreneurs with or without political participation. The mean first-day 
return for firms controlled by entrepreneurs who participate in politics is 102%, 
compared to 151% for other entrepreneurial firms. There is a significant difference in 
both the mean (at the 1% level) and median (at the 5% level) values between the two 
groups.  
Having documented the differences between underpricing in the two groups, we 
conduct a multivariate OLS regression to control for additional factors that may 
influence the size of IPO underpricing. The main independent variable in the regression 
is political participation. We also include a number of control variables commonly used 
in studies on underpricing: Market Return; Pre_Ownership, measured as the average 
annual ownership of the largest owner during three years prior to the IPO; 
                                                 
4 Although Francis et al. (2009) also analyze IPO underpricing for non-state controlled firms, they do not 
find a significant difference between a very small sample of five such firms with political connections 
and 46 firms without political connections.  
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Pre_Leverage, measured as the average annual leverage ratio during three years prior to 
the IPO; Pre_Size, measured as the natural logarithm of the average annual total assets 
during three years prior to the IPO; the P/E ratio, measured as the ratio of the offering 
price to earnings per share (EPS), where EPS is the ratio of the average annual earnings 
during three years before the IPO to the total number of post-offering shares; 
Underwriter’s Rank, a dummy variable that equals one if the lead underwriter is ranked 
among the top ten in terms of total amount raised the year before the IPO and zero 
otherwise; Underwriting cost, measured as the ratio of total underwriting fees to total 
money raised; Proceeds, measured as the natural logarithm of the offering size; Days, 
measured as the number of days between offering and listing day. Panel A in Table 5 
provides summary statistics for these pre-IPO firm characteristics in the two firm 
samples. Again, there is no significant difference in the size of the ownership of the 
largest shareholder. Turning to Leverage, there is no significant difference between 
firms with entrepreneurial political participation and common entrepreneurial firms. 
This stands in contrast to the general firm characteristics presented in Table 2, which 
showed that leverage at the end of the IPO year is significantly higher for firms 
controlled by entrepreneurs that participate in politics. This suggests that firms with 
entrepreneurial political participation increase their leverage faster than common 
entrepreneurial firms after the IPO. Firms controlled by entrepreneurs who participate in 
politics are again larger in size than common entrepreneurial firms. The P/E ratio, 
Underwriter’s rank, and Underwriting cost do not differ significantly between the two 
sample groups. Proceeds are significantly larger for firms controlled by entrepreneurs  
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who participate in politics, a natural result since such firms are on average larger than 
other entrepreneurial firms. Finally, when comparing the two groups of entrepreneurial 
firms, there is no significant difference in the number of days from offering to listing 
day. 
Panel B of Table 5 reports the results of the multivariate regression, which also 
includes industry and year dummies. Four of the control variables are significant: 
Market Returns, P/E ratio, Underwriting Cost, and Proceeds. Even when controlling for 
these additional potential factors, the effect of political participation is still significant at 
the 5% level. Political participation thus has a significant negative influence on 
underpricing for entrepreneurial firms, which means that firms controlled by 
entrepreneurs who participate in politics leave less money on the table. One reason for 
this is that political participation signals additional value and for such firms. As noted 
earlier, if entrepreneurial firms are connected through the political participation by the 
controlling entrepreneurs, they are more likely to report better accounting performance 
and reward their shareholders with higher stock prices in the future. It is therefore not 
necessary for such firms to leave as much money on the table during their public 
offerings as other entrepreneurial firms do, a result that supports the recognition of the 
value of political participation in the IPO process. 
6  Institutional effect on the value of political participation 
Our results so far are in favor of political participation having a significant effect 
on firm stock and accounting performance as well on underpricing for Chinese  
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entrepreneurial firms that goes public. We have argued that this effect may be a sign of 
the existence of rent seeking, with firms that are controlled by entrepreneurs who 
participate in politics extracting additional rent through their political ties. However, the 
effect may also be due to the possibility that entrepreneurs who are selected to become 
members of the different political congresses are actually more capable at what they do. 
Our empirical evidence so far cannot help us differentiate between these two possible 
effects. Here, we therefore take rent-seeking opportunities, measured by regional 
institution, into account. We argue that if the effect is larger in regions with more 
opportunities for rent seeking, it will indicate that the difference is due to rent seeking 
rather than entrepreneurial ability alone. We thus conduct similar tests to those in the 
previous sections, adding the three proxies for rent-seeking opportunities introduced in 
Section 3.3.  
6.1  Regression Analysis for Long-Run Stock Performance 
Table 6 reports the results of the multivariate regressions with the three-year CAR 
as the dependent variable. The first column presents the effect of political participation 
on long-run stock performance when using real GDP per capita as institutional dummy. 
The control variables are the same as in Section 4.1. The results show that political 
participation is still statistically significant at the 5% level for the three-year CARs. 
Institutions by themselves do not have a significant effect on long-run stock 
performance at any time horizon. However, we also include an interactive variable 
between Political Participation and Institutions. The interactive variable is significant at  
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the 5% level. This indicates that the value of political participation is more valuable in 
underdeveloped regions, which tend to exhibit more rent-seeking opportunities. The 
second column in Table 6 shows the results of a similar multivariate regression in which 
institutions are proxied by the level of marketization in the region of a firm’s 
headquarters. The coefficient for political participation is again significant and positive 
at the 5% level. Institutions by themselves are not significant. However, the coefficient 
for the interactive variable of political participation and institutions is once more 
significant.  
Finally, the third column in Table 6 presents the results for the multivariate 
regression in which local institutions are proxied by whether or not the province in 
which the firms have their headquarters was leased to a foreign power before 1949. 
Political participation remains significant and positive, although the coefficient for 
political participation is only significant at the 10% level. Institutions by themselves are 
not significant, while the interactive variable for political participation and institutions 
is again significant.  
To sum up the results, the three proxies for rent-seeking opportunities have a 
significant effect on the ability for entrepreneurial firms to exploit their networks gained 
through political participation for rent-seeking activities. These proxies themselves do 
not have a significant effect on stock performance. However, the interactive variable 
combining rent-seeking opportunities and political participation does have a significant 
positive effect, indicating that political participation increases the possibilities for rent 
seeking more in areas with weaker institutions.  
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6.2  Regression Analysis for Changes in Accounting Performance 
Table 7 presents the regression results of the effects of political participation on 
changes in accounting performance after an IPO. Columns 1-3 report the results using 
regional GDP per capita levels as institutional factor. The effect of political 
participation remains positive and significant for all accounting performance measures 
except the change in ROS. The dummy variable for low real GDP is not significant for 
entrepreneurial firms’ accounting performance. However, the interactive variable for 
political participation and GDP per capita levels is significant at the 5% level for both 
growth in earnings and the change in ROS.  
Columns 4-6 in Table 7 present the results for the multivariate regressions with 
level of marketization as the institutional factor. The effect of political participation is 
again significant at the 5% level for growth in sales. It is no longer significant for 
growth in earnings. However, the interactive variable for political participation and 
marketization is significant for both growth in earnings and the change in ROS. Finally, 
Columns 7-9 present the results for regressions with dummy variables for whether or 
not the region in which the entrepreneurial firm in question was leased to a foreign 
power before 1949. Again, the effect of political participation is significant and positive 
at the 5% level for growth in sales and at the 10% level for growth in earnings. The 
interactive variable for political participation and local institutions is now significant 
and positive for all three measures of accounting performance. 
  Overall, our findings again indicate that institutions are important for 
entrepreneurial firms and their changes in accounting performance after an IPO. The  
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results in the multivariate regressions show that institutions on their own do not have a 
significant effect on accounting performance. However, the opportunities for rent 
seeking through political participation are positively related to the level of institutions. 
Rent-seeking opportunities are thus important for entrepreneurial firms in China, but in 
order to exploit such opportunities, firms need to develop relationships with the political 
leadership. One way to obtain such relationships is through political participation by the 
controlling entrepreneur or by his or her family members. 
7  Conclusion 
This paper examines the impact of political participation on entrepreneurial 
firms that went public in China during 1994-2007. The empirical results show that 
political participation by the controlling entrepreneurs or their family members has a 
significant positive effect on post-IPO stock and accounting performance. Moreover, 
political participation is related to lower levels of underpricing for Chinese 
entrepreneurial IPOs. The effect of political participation on firm performance is 
stronger in regions with weaker institutions, which allow for richer rent-seeking 
opportunities.  
Our results are consistent with the rent-seeking hypothesis arguing that political 
participation by entrepreneurs facilitates rent seeking. While China’s transition from a 
planned to a market economy is unique in many ways, the results in this paper may be 
useful when analyzing other developing economies that similarly have entrepreneurs 
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Figure 1 Mean monthly cumulative abnormal returns 
 
 
This figure presents the market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), starting 
from one month after the IPO month and sorted by whether or not the controlling 





Table 1  
The sample 
Panel A: Distribution of entrepreneurial IPOs  
This panel presents the distribution of entrepreneurial IPOs by year during 1993-2007. 
Entrepreneurial firms refer to corporations controlled by entrepreneurs (or their 
families) at the time of the IPO. Columns 2-3 report the number of entrepreneurial IPOs 
and entrepreneurial firms as the percentage of the total IPO population respectively. 
Columns 4 and 5 present the number of entrepreneurial IPOs with political participation 
and such firms as a percentage of total entrepreneurial IPOs, respectively. Political 
participation is defined as the controlling entrepreneur (or their family members) being 
a member of the National People’s Congress (NPC), the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference (CPPCC), or the Congress of Chinese Communist Party 




Entrepreneurial IPOs    Entrepreneurial IPOs  
with political participation 
Year  N  As percentage of all 
IPOs (%) 
  N  As percentage of all 
entrepreneurial IPOs (%) 
1994 11  10.00    2  18.18 
1995 1  4.17    0  0.00 
1996 10  4.93    2  20.00 
1997 13  6.31    0  0.00 
1998 7  6.60    3  42.86 
1999 9  9.18    3  33.33 
2000 17  12.41    6  35.29 
2001 13  16.46    3  23.08 
2002 10  14.08    3  30.00 
2003 22  32.84    8  36.36 
2004 41  41.00    18  43.90 
2005 7  46.67    2  28.57 
2006 30    45.45    8  26.67 
2007 74  58.73    9  12.16 
Total 265  18.82    67  25.28  
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Table 1 (Continued) 
The sample 
Panel B: Distribution of entrepreneurial IPOs with political participation by 
industry 
This panel presents the distribution of entrepreneurial IPOs with political 
participation. Political participation is defined as the controlling entrepreneur (or their 
family members) becoming a member of the National People’s Congress (NPC), the 
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), or the Congress of 
Chinese Communist Party (CCCP) before the IPO event.  
 














Agriculture, forestry,  
farming and fishery 
6 15.00    3  50.00 
Mining 1  2.86    1  100.00 
Manufacturing 185  21.84    52  28.11 
Utilities 1  1.82    0  0.00 
Construction 6  20.00    2  33.33 
Transportation 4  6.45    2  50.00 
Information Technology  32  38.55    2  6.25 
Wholesale and retail trade  3  3.95    1  33.33 
Real estate  2  8.00    2  100.00 
Social Services  3  7.50    0  0.00 
Miscellaneous 22  25.00    2  9.09 


















Characteristics of firms controlled by entrepreneurs with and without political 
participation 
This table presents the summary statistics for entrepreneurial firms, distinguished by 
whether their entrepreneurs participated in politics before the IPO. Ownership is the 
percentage ownership of the largest owner at the end of the IPO year. Tobin’s Q is 
measured as the sum of total market valuation of equities and total net liabilities 
divided by total assets at the end of the IPO year. Leverage is measured as the ratio of 
total liabilities over total assets at the end of the IPO year. Firm size is measured as 
the natural logarithm of total assets at the end of the IPO year. T-tests and Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney tests are provided for comparison of the mean and median of firm and 
IPO characteristics between entrepreneurial firms with and without political 
participation. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively.  
 
 Political  participation    No political participation 
  N Mean  Median    N Mean  Median 
Ownership  67  0.399  0.403    198  0.371  0.363 
Tobin’s Q  67  3.676***  3.476***    198  2.859  2.566 
Leverage  67  0.361** 0.359**    198  0.320  0.322 







Effects of political participation on stock performance 
Panel A: Univariate tests 
This panel presents univariate tests for stock performance after the IPO, sorted by 
whether or not their entrepreneurs had political participation before the event. Stock 
performance is measured as the one-, two-, and three-year market-adjusted cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs), starting one month after the IPO month. T-tests and the 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests are provided for the difference between 
entrepreneurial IPOs by firms with and without political participation. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
 
 Political  participation    No political participation 
  N Mean  Median    N Mean  Median 
              
CARs 1 year  67  -0.047**  -0.039    198  -0.130  -0.113 
CARs 2 year  67  -0.020**  -0.015 *    198  -0.188  -0.184 
CARs 3 year  67  -0.124*** -0.113 *    198  -0.300  -0.232 




















Table 3 (continued)  
Effects of political participation on stock performance 
Panel B: Multivariate analysis 
This table presents OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is alternatively 
measured as the 1-, 2-, and 3-year market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs), starting one month after the IPO month. The independent variables are: 
Political participation, which equals one if their entrepreneurs had political 
participation before the IPO event and zero otherwise; Ownership, measured as the 
percentage ownership of the largest owner; Tobin’s Q, measured as the sum of total 
market valuation of equities and total net liabilities divided by total assets; Leverage, 
measured as the ratio of total liabilities over total assets; Size, measured as natural 
logarithm of total assets during the IPO year. Industry and year dummies are also 
included but not reported. Robust t-statistics are given in parentheses. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at top and bottom 5%. ***, **, and * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
 
  CAR one year 
after IPO  
CAR two years 
after IPO 
CAR three years 
after IPO 




































Industry indicators  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year indicators  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 265  265  265 
Adjusted R
2 0.350  0.329  0.371 










Effect of political participation on accounting performance 
Panel A: Univariate tests 
This panel presents univariate tests for changes in accounting performance after the 
IPO, sorted by whether or not the controlling entrepreneur or (his family members) 
had political participation before the event. Growth of sales (earnings) is measured as 
the growth rates of sales (earnings) from the average annual sales (earnings) of three 
years before the IPO to that of three years after the event. Change in return on sales 
(ROS) is the difference between the average annual ROS of the three years after the 
IPO and that of the three years before the event. All variables are winsorized at top 
and bottom 5%. T-tests and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests are provided for the 
difference between entrepreneurial firms with and without political connections. ***, 
**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
 
   Political participation  No political participation 
   N  Mean  Median  N  Mean  Median
            
Growth in sales  64  0.950*  0.927  182 0.837  0.796 
Growth in earnings  64  0.620*** 0.736*  182 0.199  0.569 
Change in ROS  64  -0.033  -0.022  182 -0.041  -0.03 





Table 4 (continued)  
Effect of political participation on accounting performance 
Panel B: Multivariate analysis 
This table presents the OLS regressions in which the dependent variables is, 
alternately, growth in sales, growth in earnings, and change in return on sales (ROS). 
The independent variables include political participation, which equals one for firms 
with political participation before the IPO and zero otherwise, Tobin’s Q, measured as 
the sum of total market valuation of equities and total net liabilities divided by total 
sales in the IPO year, leverage, measured as the ratio of total liabilities over total sales 
in the IPO year, and size, measured as natural logarithm of total sales in the IPO year. 
Sales are used instead of assets as denominator due to the effect of IPO on assets. 
Industry and year dummies are included but not reported. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at top and bottom 5%. Robust t-statistics are given in parentheses. *** ,** 
,and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
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Industry indicators  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year indicators  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 246  246  246 
Adjusted R






Effect of Political Participation on IPO underpricing  
Panel A: Univariate Test 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of IPO underpricing and control variables 
for entrepreneurial firms in China during 1994-2007, distinguished by whether or not 
the entrepreneurs had political participation before the event. Underpricing is 
measured as the difference between the closing price on the first trading day and the 
offering price, divided by the offering price. Pre_Ownership is the average annual   
ownership of the largest owner during the three years prior to the offering. 
Pre_Leverage is measured as the average annual leverage ratio during three years 
before the IPO. Pre_ size is measured as the natural logarithm of the average annual 
total assets during three year before the IPO. P/E ratio is measured as the ratio of the 
offering price to earnings per share (EPS), where EPS is the ratio of the average 
annual earnings during three years before the IPO to the total number of post-offering 
shares. Underwriter’s Rank is a dummy variable that equals one if the lead 
underwriter is ranked among the top 10 in terms of total amount raised the year before 
the IPO and 0 otherwise. Underwriting Cost is measured as the ratio of total 
underwriting fees to total money raised. Proceeds is the natural logarithm of the 
offering size. Days is the number of days between the offering and listing day. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 5%. T-tests and Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney tests are provided for the comparison of the mean and median of firm 
and IPO characteristics between entrepreneurial firms with and without political 
connections. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively.  
 
Panel A: Underpricing for entrepreneurial firms  
 Political  participation    No political participation 
 N  Mean  Median    N  Mean  Median 
             
Underpricing 67  1.02***  0.871**    190  1.514  1.217 
Pre_Ownership 67  0.563 0.550    190  0.517  0.503 
Pre_Leverage 67  0.566  0.573    190  0.550  0.567 
Pre_ size  67  19.704***  19.525**    190  19.404  19.372 
P/E ratio  67  33.217  31.443    190  34.042  32.459 
Underwriter’s rank  67  0.308  0    190  0.356  0 
Underwriting cost  67  0.038  0.045    190  0.045  0.046 
Proceeds 67  19.635***  19.615  ***    190  19.333  19.331 
Days 67  21.326  -14.000    190  21.978  15.000 
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Table 5 (continued)  
Effect of Political Participation on IPO underpricing  
Panel B: Multivariate test 
This table reports OLS regressions with underpricing as the dependent variable.  The 
independent variables are: Political participation, which equals one if the entrepreneur 
had political participation before the IPO and zero otherwise; Market return, measured 
as equally weighted cumulated returns for all stocks traded in China from the offering 
day to the listing day; Pre_Ownership, the average annual ownership of the largest 
owner during the three years prior to the offering; Pre_Leverage, the leverage ratio 
measured as the average annual leverage ratio during the three years prior to the 
offering; Pre_Size, measured as the natural logarithm of average annual total assets 
during the three years prior to the offering; Pre_P/E ratio, measured as the ratio of 
offering price to earnings per share; Underwriter’s rank, a dummy variable equal to 
one if the lead underwriter is ranked among the top ten underwriters; Underwriting 
cost, measured as the ratio of total underwriting fees to total money raised; Proceeds, 
the natural logarithm of the offering size; Days, the number of days between the 
offering and listing day. Industry and year dummies are included but not reported. 
Robust t-statistics are given in parentheses. All continuous variables are winsorized at 
the top and bottom 5%. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, 












P/E ratio  0.010*** 
(2.61)





















Effects of Institutions on the association between political participation and stock 
performance 
This table presents the OLS regression results of the effects of political participation 
on stock performance, sorted by local institutions. The dependent variable is, 
alternatively, measured as cumulative market-adjusted abnormal returns (CARs) for 
three years, starting from one month after the IPO. The independent variables are: 
Political participation, which equals one if the controlling entrepreneur has political 
participation before the IPO event and zero otherwise; Proxies for local institutions; 
the interaction of political connections and institutions; Ownership, measured as the 
percentage ownership of the largest owner; Tobin’s Q, measured as the sum of total 
market valuation of equities and total net liabilities divided by total assets; Leverage, 
measured as the ratio of total liabilities over total assets; Size, measured as natural 
logarithm of total assets in the IPO year.  
Proxies for institutions are: GDP per capita, measured as above or below the 
sample median value of local average real GDP per capita during 1979-2007 
(Institutions equal one if local GDP per capita is below the sample median value and 
zero otherwise); Marketization, based on whether or not the firm’s headquarter is 
from a relatively more developed region, using the National Economic Research 
Institute (NERI) Index of Marketization for China’s provinces (Institutions equal one 
if a firm’s headquarter is located in a less well developed region and zero otherwise); 
Leased provinces, based on whether or not the firm’s headquarter are located in 
province that was once leased to industrial countries before 1949 (Institutions equal 
one if a firm’s headquarter is located in a province that was never leased to foreign 
powers countries before 1949 and zero otherwise).  Industry and year dummies are 
also included but not reported. Robust t-statistics are given in parentheses. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 5%.  ***, **, and * denote 


















Table 6 (continued) 
Effects of Institutions on the association between political participation and stock 
performance 
 




















































Industry indicator  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year indicator  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 265  265  265 
Adjusted R
2 0.399  0.396  0.398 













Table 7  
Effects of Institutions on the association between political participation and accounting performance 
This table presents the OLS regression results of the effects of political participation and local institutions on changes in accounting 
performance after the IPO event. The dependent variables in this table are alternatively measured as growth in sales, growth in earnings 
and ROS change. The independent variables include: Political participation, which equals one if the controlling entrepreneur has  
political participation before the IPO and zero otherwise; Institutions, the proxy for local institutions; Political participation*Institutions, 
the interaction of political connections and institutions; Ownership, measured as the percentage ownership of the largest owner; Tobin’s 
Q, measured as the sum of total market valuation of equities and total net liabilities divided by total assets; Leverage, measured as the 
ratio of total liabilities over total sales; Firm size, measured as natural logarithm of total sales in the IPO year. Industry and year dummies 
are included but not reported. All variables are winsorized at 5% and 95%. Robust t-statistics are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Proxies for institutions are: GDP per capita, measured as above or below the sample median value of local average real GDP per capita 
during 1979-2007 (Institutions equal one if local GDP per capita is below the sample median value and zero otherwise); Marketization, 
based on whether or not the firm’s headquarter is located in a relatively more developed region, using the National Economic Research 
Institute (NERI) Index of Marketization for China’s provinces (Institutions equal one if a firm’s headquarter is located in a less well 
developed region and zero otherwise); Leased provinces, based on whether or not the firm’s headquarter are located in a province that 
was once leased to industrial countries before 1949 (Institutions equal one if a firm’s headquarter is located in a province that was never 











Table 7 (Continued) 
Effects of political participation and local institutions on accounting performance  
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Industry indicator  Yes  Yes Yes   Yes Yes  Yes   Yes Yes Yes
Year indicator Yes  Yes Yes   Yes Yes  Yes   Yes Yes Yes
N  246  246 246   246 246  246   246 246 246
Adjusted R
2 0.171  0.074 0.159   0.152 0.075  0.181   0.169 0.079 0.160
 